April 8, 2015

Incapable of Discrimination?

      The recent spat (and then some) over the Indiana RFRA has proven to be an occasion for a great deal of consideration (and reconsideration...and reconsideration) as to the state of religious freedom in our country. On one side, the promoters of RFRA considered it as nearly a mirror of the model passed by the federal government and some 19 other states, and hardly controversial in that aspect. Opponents of the law termed it, in essence, legalized discrimination, which would permit people such as pizza shop owners (to name a notorious instance) to refuse to serve gay weddings, or as the more worked-up opponents hinted, to permit doctors to refuse to treat homosexual patients. So forceful was the "anti" response that the Indiana legislature and governor ended up dismantling the law in part (or "fixing," depending on your feelings about the law) and potentially moving the State of Indiana further along the road to gay "rights" than prior to the RFRA's original passage. Many intelligent comments have been made about aspects of the controversy, including by Ross Douthat (here), Rod Dreher (here and here), and R.R. Reno (here). 

      What can I hope to add to this chorus of intelligent discussion? Well my hope is that I can place at least some of this outcry against Indiana's RFRA in a new light. So, I claim not complete originality, but at the very least, I hope to stimulate some thought about where we find ourself.

      The catalyst for my ruminations is a letter excerpted in one of the Dreher pieces, linked above. The writer, a Catholic theologian in Philadelphia, mentions three scenarios regarding baking cakes for homosexual couples. I reproduce the parts of this letter I find important below:
Imagine a gay male couple who have been together for 20 years. They live nearby. You know them well, having a friendly non-political neighborly relationship. You borrow the odd egg, watch each other’s pets when somebody is on vacation, maybe chat at the annual 4th of July party.You are an orthodox Christian who runs a bakery business. Now apply the following scenarios:
          A) One of the gay guys has a birthday. His partner asks you to bake the cake. Would you?
B) One of the gay guys dies. His partner asks you to bake the cake for the reception after the funeral. Would you?
C) Marriage is suddenly legalized in your state. They marry and ask you to bake the cake. Would you?
Seems to me that if the answer is no, no, and no, then you ought to examine yourself for homophobia.
But if the answer is yes, yes and no – that’s my answer – then you are arguably simply being principled. I can say “yes” to A and B because I can honor their friendship and loyalty to each other, their faithful service to each other over years. However, I say “no” to C because marriage is not an institution that can be defined entirely in terms of affection, loyalty and service. Or even eros or heartfelt private romantic feelings. Marriage includes all those things, but it exists is a social institution because the fertility of male and female potentially creates uniquely public consequences (children).
The left disputes my premise for saying no to C. Fine, let’s have that debate. People of goodwill can disagree.
But we are not even allowed to have that debate. My side’s case is dismissed by the liberal elite because they think people like me are haters.
      The question is, often, why are people who draw the above distinction considered to be "haters," rather than "principled"? I posit several, interrelated, cultural trends which I think must be considered in approaching this gulf between "principle" and "hate."

      I think that any discussion must start with Jonathan Haidt's moral foundations theory (nicely summarized here), specifically that we, as political beings, have certain moral systems upon which we rest our political decisions (and eventually, our party choice). He posits that there are two systems which are important to both the liberal and conservatives, namely: Care / Harm and Liberty / Oppression. However, there is another which is important to conservatives, but somewhat less important to liberals (fairness / cheating), and three others which are important to conservatives, but matter very little to liberals (loyalty / betrayal, authority / subversion, and sanctity / degradation). Now, briefly summed, what this means is that "liberals value Care and Fairness much more than the other three moral foundations whereas conservative endorse all five more or less equally," as noted in this Scientific American discussion of and with Haidt.

     My own theory, having not read enough of Haidt's writing to flesh it out fully, is that people who invest heavily in one or two of those areas and give little important to others view alliances to the other areas to be, essentially, irrational, while viewing only the two to which one gives allegiance as "rational." In other words, those focused heavily in Care and Fairness (which may be seen at the heart of the anti-RFRA outcry - summary: "it's unfair to deny to homosexuals the same right to marry as anyone else, and it's hurtful to say or act in that manner"), will invest those with sacred qualities in subsuming the other qualities to Care and Fairness, and will view those with commitments to Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as, in essence, irrational or even "evil."

      This, then, results in the view that those who also place sanctity in other areas of life (marriage, child-rearing) and authority (in tradition, in hierarchy, in God, etc.) as having no rational basis upon which to oppose gay marriage and gay childbearing / adoption. I submit that the modern mind, especially as seen among millennials on the gay marriage issue (and interestingly, on abortion, where growing opposition, seemingly out of sync with support for gay marriage, likely finds support in values of "fair" and "harm"), is heavily, and almost entirely, invested in the Fairness aspects of Haidt's framework, and little understands, nor seeks to understand, other commitments which vie for loyalty in the mind of the conservative and (perhaps) classical liberal.

      The modern mind dislikes discrimination so much because, in the end, any discrimination requires drawing lines, requires making distinctions. But, our whole system of education, growing out of the similar culture, has for years been focused on whether any given is "unfair" to some person or group, and makes that person or group "unequal." Moreover, to that mind, since no person wants to be unfairly treated, does not want to "be unequal," it cannot be the fault of any person that they are not "equal" with another - therefore, it must be an external oppression that is producing the inequality. There is no room in such an analysis for any commitment to tradition or religious scruple that can overcome claims of equality and fairness, and therefore, there is no need to analyze or understand the arguments making such claims, because ipso facto, such arguments do not exist. In addition, though people arguing for religious or traditional commitments are using language which should be familiar in argument, such language is assembled in ways which are incomprehensible to the equality mind. Therefore, no matter what argument is so made, it cannot communicate, cannot contribute, anything of value to the discussion, and must be ignored. Any argument with a premise that results in unequal treatment of persons, for any reason or purpose, is dead out of the starting gate, whether rooted in biology, psychology, or any other science or statistics. Hence, the responses to studies, such as that of Mark Regnerus showing problems with gay parenting, consisting of "biased" or "hateful," which simply seem ad hominem. The study itself does not support the "everyone is equal" worldview, and therefore, is either biased, or shows a temporary state of things before society adjusts to a new, enforced, morality.

      Finally, the theologian quoted above is at the mercy of those completely unable to discriminate. A mind which comprehends Haidt's six values and places some importance on all of them is capable of understanding different sides of an argument, and is also capable, then, of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of such arguments. But a mind fully trained and cultured in the traits of equality and fairness, ignoring all others, is incapable of distinguishing, in discriminating, among good and bad arguments, good and faulty premises, and is, therefore, wont to accuse all arguments not premising absolute equality as existing only in unfairnesshatred of equality, and etc. To this mind, there is no difference between status and conduct (see the theologian's distinction above), and no possible way for loyalty and tradition to compete with equality in any given scenario. To this mind, also, there is no hierarchy of good, no distinction among art or music, because of this similar lack of discrimination. While there can be absolute goods (the environment, guilt-free, consequence-free, sex, etc.), these goods, and the ways in which they can be achieved, are not up for debate. There can be no debate - there can be no lines drawn...for there is no discrimination.

No comments:

Post a Comment